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Abstract: In this paper, we propose a decision framework where people are individually 
asked to either actively consent or dissent to some pro-social behavior. We hypothesize that 
confronting individuals with the choice of engaging in a specific pro-social behavior 
contributes to the formation of issue-specific altruistic preferences while simultaneously 
involving a commitment. The hypothesis is tested in a large-scale field experiment on blood 
donation. We find that this "active-decision" intervention substantially increases the actual 
donation behavior of people who have not fully formed preferences beforehand. 
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One of the biggest challenges to institutional choice is the design and implementation of 
decision-making mechanisms that promote pro-social behavior. Alfred Marshall noted in 
1890 that “[n]o doubt men, even now, are capable of much more unselfish service than they 
generally render: And the supreme aim of the economist is to discover how this latent social 
asset can be developed most quickly, and turned to account most wisely.” 
In this paper, we propose and empirically study a decision framework where people are 
individually asked to either actively consent or dissent to some pro-social behavior. This is in 
stark contrast to some noncommittal appeal to behave pro-socially that often addresses 
everybody alike. Consider, for example, the issue of blood donation. With an active decision, 
people are confronted with a request to donate blood to which they are expected to respond 
with either a “yes” or a “no”. It is argued that an active decision induces people to deal with 
some specific pro-social behavior and makes them aware of the social value of some 
particular behavior. In doing so, active decisions contribute to the formation of issue specific 
altruistic preferences while simultaneously involving a commitment. We thus understand 
active decisions as an elicitation mechanism, as mentioned by Marshall, being capable of 
transforming a latent willingness to donate, contribute or share in actual pro-social behavior.1 
This is our basic hypothesis. 
The functioning of active decisions builds on four behavioral regularities analyzed in research 
on economics and psychology. 
First, preferences are partly formed in the process of decision-making in unfamiliar choice 
situations. A pertinent example is the creation of non-use values in contingent valuation 
studies (Kahneman et al. 1999). In active decisions, peopleare made aware of some particular 
issue and are induced to engage in cognitive evaluations and reasoning (e.g. Cioffi and Garner 
1996). In blood and post-mortem organ donation, the deliberation involves dealing with one’s 
own health, and people are motivated to get over the denial and repression of their own 
mortality. 
Second, people do not always act strictly and narrowly in a self-interested manner, but engage 
in pro-social behavior like donating blood, volunteering, giving money to charities, 
participating in democratic politics, or even putting their own health or life at risk to rescue 
someone in peril. 
                                                
1 Active decision-making might also be relevant in overcoming self-control problems. Choi et al. 
(2004) study the effect of active decisions on the likelihood of joining a pension savings plan. 
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Third, the way situations of choice are presented influences people's decisions (framing 
effects). In particular, there is a strong tendency to stick with the option that reflects the status 
quo (Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988) or that which becomes effective if an individual does 
not explicitly choose some alternative (so-called defaults; Thaler and Sunstein 2003). Active 
decisions are a special form of framing/defaults: the options for deferring or repressing a 
decision are removed from the individually perceived opportunity set. 
Fourth, people aim to act consistently with regard to decisions made or positions chosen in the 
past, i.e. commitments (Cialdini 2001). Commitments change people’s self-image and past 
behavior provides information about one’s own preferences. This is partly due to processes of 
self-signaling that support and reinforce people’s self-image (Bodner and Prelec 2003). 
Commitments that active decisions bring about can thus entail consistent behavior in the 
future, even though some initial "cheap" consent will involve high pecuniary or non-
pecuniary costs at a later point in time. 
The behavioral consequences of confronting people with the decision to act pro-socially are 
not uniform, but depend on the degree of stability of their altruistic preferences with regard to 
some specific issue. The effect of active decisions on behavior, by its very nature, relies on 
the endogenous formation of preferences through the process of decision-making. We thus 
expect active decisions to be more effective when people are unaware of the importance of 
some specific pro-social engagement, and when their latent motivation to donate or contribute 
would otherwise remain dormant. We refer to this qualification as refined hypothesis. In 
contrast, if people are well aware of some public good and have already made up their mind 
about their contribution to it, preferences can be expected to be rather stable and little affected 
by active decisions. If these same people are confronted with an active-decision mechanism, 
they might actually perceive the intervention as intrusive and even reduce their contribution 
(see Frey 1997 for a general account of the crowding-out effect in contributions to public 
goods). 
We study the potential of active decisions for voluntary blood donation. The steady tightening 
of access criteria for blood donors increases the risk of excess demand for blood. It is still 
technically impossible to artificially reproduce blood compounds. If new donors are not 
successfully recruited on a regular basis, blood shortages can become a central health care 
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problem.2 Moreover, there is evidence that many latent donors never contemplated becoming 
an active donor (Riedel et al. 2000). We thus hypothesize that an active decision framework 
can successfully elicit blood donations. 
Our study was incorporated in a Red Cross blood drive at the University of Zurich. In total, 
more than 1,800 students participated. They neither knew that an experiment was taking place 
nor that researchers from the economics department were involved. Professors granted us 
permission to distribute a brief survey during the last ten minutes before the break in the 
middle of their lectures, and to make a brief announcement regarding the blood drive. There 
were three experimental conditions implemented: In the active decision treatment, the survey 
contained a page at the end asking the subjects whether they were willing to donate blood at 
one of the times mentioned on the information sheet. They had two possible choices: yes or 
no. If they answered yes, they had to say when they would show up for the blood donation. In 
the first control condition, the last page of the survey was nearly identical; we merely added a 
third possible option – stating that they were undecided. In the second control condition, there 
was no such page at the end of the survey. However, along with the survey, all students also 
received an information sheet, listing dates and times in the week to come when they could 
donate blood. To obtain a measure of the latency of pro-social preferences, we asked the 
students in the survey whether they felt they were sufficiently informed about the importance 
of donating blood. 
Our results lend support to the hypothesis that active decisions play an important role in 
uncovering latent pro-social preferences. We find that among students who indicated that they 
were not sufficiently aware about the importance of donating blood, the active decision 
treatment increased blood donations significantly relative to the two other conditions. The 
difference is larger with regard to the second control group. Confronting this group of 
subjects with explicit choice options thus increases participation. This also holds when we 
condition on previous blood donations. Hence, the result is not due to mere experimentation 
to find out what donating blood is like. In contrast, we even find a slightly negative effect 
(albeit not statistically significant) for the active decision treatment on blood donation for the 
group of students who stated that they are sufficiently aware about the importance of donating 
                                                
2 We emphasize voluntary blood donation because no accepted alternative social arrangement for 
activating people to donate blood seems to exist. In particular, a majority rejects the installation of a 
market, and markets of this type did not perform well in the past (for a discussion, see Titmuss 1972). 
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blood. Overall, we interpret the results as evidence that active decisions can help develop 
Marshall's latent social asset. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section I describes the experimental 
design in detail. Section II provides descriptive statistics, and section III presents the results of 
the experiment. Section IV offers concluding remarks.  
I. Experimental Setup 
We conducted our study in the context of a regular blood drive that the Swiss Red Cross 
(SRC) arranges at the University of Zurich. In a normal year, the SRC simply posts 
information material in classrooms with information on the hours and location of the blood 
drive. In the winter semester 2004/2005, the Swiss Red Cross, in collaboration with us, 
obtained permission to conduct a study in seven large undergraduate lectures at the University 
of Zurich. 
The study consisted of a brief survey, which contained demographics, questions aimed at 
measuring pro-social preferences, and personality scales. The survey also contained several 
questions regarding donating blood. Our key question capturing the awareness of the 
importance of donating blood read "Do you feel sufficiently informed about the importance of 
donating blood?" and had to be answered with a “yes” or a “no”. We consider answers to this 
question to be proxy of whether an individual has made up her mind about donating blood, 
one way or the other. The question avoids asking specifically about topic-related knowledge. 
However, individuals answering "no" have arguably given less thought to the matter, without 
implying a preference in either direction. 
A. Treatments 
There were three experimental conditions:  
Treatment Group (TG): For the subjects in the treatment group, the last page of the survey 
contained a sheet inviting them to donate blood. It listed the times and places of the blood 
drive. Most importantly, the individuals were asked to either consent or dissent to 
participating in the blood drive by ticking a "yes" or "no" box. If a subject chose to 
participate, he or she was asked to commit to an actual date and time for the blood donation. 
All subjects also received a separate information sheet, looking identical to the last page of 
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the survey, except that it did not contain the question asking them to decide whether or not to 
donate blood. In bold letters, it said "for you to take home" on that sheet. 
Control Group 1 (CG1): The last sheet for this group was almost identical to that of the TG. 
The only difference was that it contained an additional box, saying "I do not want to make a 
decision" [about donating blood], i.e. no decision was required. Subjects in CG1 also received 
the information sheet to take home. 
Control Group 2 (CG2): The survey did not contain a page asking this group to make a 
choice. Like everybody else, however, the subjects in CG2 received a sheet containing 
identical pieces of information about the blood drive. 
B. Procedures 
In order to implement the treatments in a large population, we selected seven large lectures 
and asked the professors to concede 10 minutes of their lectures before the break. A 
representative of the SRC gave a brief informative presentation, while the assistants 
distributed the survey. It can safely be assumed that the students were not aware that an 
experiment was being conducted. 
We decided how to distribute the different treatments in the lecture rooms based on their 
layout plans. To ensure that students would not notice that an experiment was being 
conducted, we used natural "barriers", such as aisles, to separate the sections in which 
different treatments were distributed. The assignment of the treatments to the different 
treatment sections was random. Depending on the layout of the lecture room, it was 
sometimes not possible to conduct all three treatments. Therefore, treatments are randomized 
within lectures, but not between them.  
Special care was taken to ensure identical information conditions for all subjects. After the 
students had worked on the survey for about 5 minutes, the assistants distributed the 
additional information sheet that contained the same information (and the same invitation, 
word by word) as the last page of the survey for the TG and CG1. This was to make sure that 
all students not only had the same information regarding the times and places of the blood 
drive, but also regarding the normative value of the campaign. We printed the extra sheet on 
colored paper to ensure that the students would notice it. Furthermore, the times and places of 
the blood drive were also mentioned during the SRC representative's presentation. After 10 to 
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15 minutes, the subjects left the lecture room to take a break and handed in the questionnaires 
to the support staff at the exit doors. 
II. Descriptive Statistics 
Participation in the study was very high; the response rate was well above 95%.3 In total, 
1,852 questionnaires were handed in. Four people were younger than 18 and thus not allowed 
to donate blood. Another 10 people did not answer the question regarding awareness of the 
importance of donating blood. It was possible to match all the blood donations to one of 
remaining 1,838 subjects. 
Table 1 provides a first impression of the data. It shows the stated willingness to donate 
blood, the fraction of individuals actually donating blood in the blood drive, and the answers 
to the question regarding awareness of the importance of donating blood. 14% of the 
respondents indicate a willingness to donate blood in the survey. This fraction is calculated 
based on the stated preferences of the subjects in the TG and CG1. 7.6% of the sample 
population actually donates blood. The table shows that donations differ considerably 
between the different courses covered. First and second-year medical students express by far 
the highest propensity to donate blood, followed by biology students. It is very difficult to 
interpret any difference in donation behavior across courses as they might reflect differences 
in preferences, work load, study schedule etc. 
There are also differences in answers to the awareness question between courses. While 
almost 90% of the second-year medical students answer that they feel sufficiently informed 
about the importance of donating blood, only slightly more than half of the students in the 
journalism course say so. 
As there are clear differences in the propensity to donate blood across subjects of study (as 
documented in Table 1), and as we only randomized treatments within lectures, we purge the 
data in Table 2 of any course specific effects. Specifically, we normalize the data by 
subtracting the corresponding course average from each observation. 
Table 2 presents this normalized data cut by treatment and by awareness. We first report 
descriptive statistics for actual blood donation behavior. Adjusted mean effects are shown in 
the upper half of Table 2. The effect of the active decision treatment on blood donations 
depends strongly on whether the subjects feel aware of the importance of donating blood or 
                                                
3 Only a few people were observed leaving the lecture halls without handing in a questionnaire. 
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not. Subjects answering "no" to the awareness question show a clear increase in the tendency 
to donate blood in the TG relative to CG1 and CG2. The last column of Table 2 calculates the 
difference between the TG and CG2, and the associated standard error of the estimate. The 
difference is large relative to the baseline propensity to donate blood: The fraction of donors 
increases by 7.2 percentage points. The standard error for this difference is small, indicating a 
statistically significant treatment effect. On the other hand, subjects who respond with a “yes” 
to the awareness question are not more likely to donate blood if assigned to the TG. If 
“aware” people are explicitly asked to make a decision on whether or not to donate blood, 
they are less likely to donate blood than in the other treatments. As the last column shows, the 
fraction of donors is reduced by 2.9 percentage points in the TG relative to CG2. 
The lower half of Table 2 shows the survey responses to the invitation to donate blood in the 
TG and CG1. Irrespective of whether individuals feel aware of the importance of blood 
donations, the additional option ("I do not want to make a decision.") in CG1 seems to reduce 
the fraction of individuals saying they will donate blood. This finding reflects that for actual 
donation behavior. The last column in Table 2 calculates the difference between the TG and 
CG1 and the corresponding standard error. For both groups, regarding the stated willingness 
to donate, the standard error is large relative to the size of the effect.  
III. Results 
A. Blood Donations 
The data allows us to examine the effects of active decisions on actual blood donations, and 
further on the stated willingness to donate blood expressed in the absence of costly 
consequences, i.e. in a cheap talk situation. We estimate the impact of the experiment on 
blood donations (and stated preferences) using a linear probability model with robust standard 
errors (for a discussion see Moffitt 1999). Where possible, we also adjust the standard errors 
for possible clustering on the course level. As this reduces the effective degrees of freedom to 
the number of courses, we can only apply this procedure in specifications with fewer than 
seven variables included. 
In Table 3, the dependent variable is equal to one if an individual donates blood and zero 
otherwise. Thus, the coefficients of any variable in this regression can be directly interpreted 
as the change in the fraction of individuals donating blood resulting from a one-unit increase 
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in the independent variable, holding the value of the other variables constant. We also present 
the probit-model estimates in the appendix; qualitatively, they yield the same results. 
The effect of the treatments on blood donations is reported in Table 3. We choose CG2, in 
which subjects were not required to fill out a decision sheet, as the reference category. As 
before, the treatment effect is reported separately for people who are not aware of the issue 
and for those who are aware of the issue. 
We find that people without well-formed preferences (first column of Table 3) are 
substantially more likely to donate blood if they are exposed to the active decision. We 
estimate that the treatment leads to an 8.7 percentage-points increase in the probability of 
donating blood relative to CG2. Even after adjusting the covariance matrix for clustering at 
the course level, our treatment effect is still highly significant.4 The effect is almost 
unchanged and still highly statistically significant if a large set of additional control variables 
is taken into account (third column of Table 3). Importantly, one of the control variables 
includes whether the individual has donated blood before. Since the point estimate is virtually 
unaffected when past behavior is included as a control, our effect does not seem to be due to 
mere subject experimentation to find out what donating blood is like. The additional control 
variables are jointly statistically significant predictors of blood donation behavior. 
Individuals in CG1 are also slightly more likely to donate blood than individuals in CG2. 
Contrary to our prediction, there is some evidence that already the exposure to choice can 
mobilize pro-social behavior, independent of whether only a “yes” and a “no” option is 
available, or whether an option for “no decision” is also offered, but our sample  size does not 
allow us to estimate this effect accurately. Ex post, this might also be explained by the factual 
possibility of leaving the decision sheet blank, which was available to all the individuals in 
the TG and CG1. However, the standard error of the estimated coefficient for CG1 prevents 
us from drawing definite conclusions regarding CG1. 
The experimental intervention matters much less for people who are aware of the issue and 
who have supposedly already made up their mind about donating blood. For people in the TG, 
we actually find a slightly lower probability (-2.4 percentage points) of donating blood – 
                                                
4 In order to calculate these standard errors, we de-mean the data on the course-level. This is  
algebraically equivalent to including dummy variables in the regression, but does not reduce 
the degrees of freedom (as we are not calculating the covariance matrix for the course 
effects).  
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although not statistically significant – than in CG2 (second column of Table 3). The finding is 
very similar when we add more controls in the fourth column of Table 3. 
We examine two alternative interpretations to our results: The first one states that the findings 
reflect experimentation and that our measure for awareness is picking up a preference for 
finding out about the process of donating blood (How much does it hurt? Do I feel dizzy 
afterwards?). Remember, we argue that our treatments uncover latent social preferences, not 
the process of donating itself. It is, thus, important to distinguish between the two 
explanations. At the outset, one has to keep in mind that we already control for past blood 
donations in Table 3. Hence any higher propensity to donate blood in order to "experiment" 
by former non-donors is absorbed in the equation and is uncorrelated with our treatments. 
However, as we argued before, the active decision treatment may have offered a form of 
mental commitment and thus a better technology to learn about blood donations. This raises 
the possibility that people who never donated blood before may have been encouraged to 
"experiment" more in the TG than in CG1 and CG2.  
We examine this alternative explanation by exploiting that there are still subjects who donated 
blood but answer that they are not sufficiently aware of the importance of blood donations. 
Still, 16% of the subjects who donated blood before state that they are not sufficiently aware 
of the importance of blood donations. Though this group is relatively small (70 individuals), 
we can examine this group still responds to our treatments as we hypothesized earlier. The 
results are displayed in Table 4, where we estimate the treatment effects for this group as the 
main effect, and interaction terms for the group of subjects who never donated blood before. 
We find little evidence that our treatment only impacts the behavior of subjects who never 
donated blood before. Individuals who donated blood before, but still do not feel sufficiently 
aware of the importance of blood donations, are more likely to donate blood in the treatment 
group: The point estimate is virtually unchanged relative to the baseline results in Table 3, but 
estimated less precisely because of the small number of observations in this cell. Still, the 
effect is significant at the 10% level, and their response to the treatment is undistinguishable 
from the group of individuals who never donated blood before (p = 0.78). The second column 
in Table 4 shows that for people who state that they are aware of the importance of blood 
donation, there is also no response to the treatment when they have never donated blood 
before. This, again, lends little support to the hypothesis that the active decision treatment 
encouraged subjects to try and learn about blood donations in general. Our findings indicate 
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that they respond to the treatment when they feel they are not aware of the importance of 
blood donations, not the act of donating blood per se. 
The second alternative explanation is that our treatment may have facilitated blood donations 
of individuals with a self-control problem due to present-biased preferences (see, e.g., 
O'Donoghue and Rabin, 1999). Present-biased preferences have been shown to have strong 
effects on behavior in similar realms (Della Vigna and Malmendier, 2005). The aspect that 
our treatment group was offered a form of mental commitment may have facilitated blood 
donations of individuals with present-biased preferences. Because of this present-bias, they 
may also be less aware of the importance of blood donations. In our survey, we asked the 
respondents a simple question to measure impatience: Would they prefer CHF 50 right now or 
CHF 60 two months from now? We use the responses to this question as a proxy for 
impatience. The individuals split roughly 50:50 on the two options. In columns (3) and (4) of 
Table 4, we interact the treatment effects with impatience. If our treatments act through 
mitigating self-control problems, we would expect to see a larger treatment effect on 
individuals who act impatiently in the survey. However, we find no difference between the 
two groups. Column (3) shows a strong effect of TG on donations of individuals who are not 
aware of blood donations and choose the patient response in our question. There is no 
difference in the treatment effect to the group who chooses the impatient response (p = 0.31). 
Further, commitment opportunities are to individuals with self-control problems are the same 
for individuals who feel sufficiently informed about blood donations. Yet, we find no 
evidence in column (4) that impatient individuals are more likely to donate blood in TG. 
Overall, these results lend little support to the alternative explanation.   
In sum, the active-decision intervention does not generally increase the probability of 
donating blood. Rather, and in line with the refined hypothesis, the treatment effect depends 
on whether people already formed preferences about donating blood. If people who do not 
feel sufficiently aware of the issue are approached, active decisions affect pro-social behavior 
even when high immediate costs are involved. 
 
B. Stated Preferences 
Table 5 summarizes the results for people’s stated willingness to donate blood. The active 
decision treatment effect is calculated relative to CG1, i.e. people who have a third choice 
  12 
option indicating “no decision”. CG2 is not included at this stage because no explicit decision 
has to be made in the questionnaire by people in this group. 
We find that the active decision treatment has a positive effect on the expressed willingness to 
donate in accordance with the basic hypothesis. There is a difference in the treatment effect 
between people who are not aware of the issue and those who are aware of the issue of 4.4 
percentage points, however imprecisely estimated (first and second column of Table 5). The 
probability of stating a willingness to donate blood increases by 7.1 percentage points for 
people who are not aware of the issue, but is only borderline significant. In contrast, there is 
only an increase of 2.7 percentage points (not statistically significant) for people who are 
aware of the issue. This difference in the treatment effects between the two groups becomes 
somewhat more pronounced when a large set of additional control variables from the survey 
is included (third and fourth column of Table 5). 
In sum, we find that the implemented active decision framework has a significant effect on 
stated preferences for individuals indicating relative unawareness of the topic and their own 
contribution. In contrast, no significant effect is measured for those who are aware of the 
issue. Thus, we do not observe the predicted general positive effect. However, the results 
show the asymmetry in the treatment effect, depending on the formation of preferences as 
formulated in the refined hypothesis. 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
We examine whether an active-decision framework affects perception and cognition 
processes to the extent that pro-social behavior is evoked. People are asked in an active 
decision to either consent or dissent to a request in an otherwise unrestrained choice situation, 
i.e. subjects are de facto confronted with the same behavioral options as in a situation where 
no active decision is involved. Behavioral consequences of active decisions arise if by asking 
for an explicit statement, (i) cognitive processes are stimulated in which a more in-depth 
examination of the request’s content takes place than in the case of not requesting an explicit 
answer, and (ii) the expressed choice is understood as commitment. 
The effect of active decision on pro-social behavior is studied in a large-scale field 
experiment in blood donation. Almost 2,000 people were invited in a non-binding manner to 
donate blood at a blood drive, which was taking place the week after the survey intervention. 
In a newly designed questionnaire, people answered various topic and attitude-related 
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questions. Individuals assigned to the treatment group are explicitly asked at the end of the 
questionnaire whether they are willing to donate blood in the upcoming blood drive or not. In 
the first control group, individuals have the additional option of ticking a box, which states 
that they do not want to make a decision. In the second control group, no explicit request is 
formulated in the questionnaire. 
We find that, for people without well formed preferences on blood donation, an active 
decision intervention increases their likelihood of donating blood despite the high immediate 
opportunity costs. This supports the basic behavioral hypothesis. Rather than a smaller 
positive effect, we find a small, although not statistically significant, negative effect for 
people who report being aware of the blood donation issue.  
The active decision also affects people’s stated willingness to donate blood in case they have 
no fully formed preferences about the issue. In the field of blood donation, the effect on the 
preference statement is, of course, of less relevance. However, it indicates that an active 
decision might be effective in other social areas, like post-mortem organ donation or 
individual saving behavior where a statement with low immediate costs puts people on a 
donor list or in a savings plan. This might be seen as an ethically attractive alternative to 
presumed consent. 
Our results differ from those in research on mere measurement effects (Morwitz et al. 1993) 
where, for example, asking people whether they intend to buy “a car” is shown to increase 
their probability of actually buying one. An active-decision intervention elicits pro-social 
behavior oriented towards a specific activity. The results further indicate that whether or not 
people act pro-socially is not given, but is rather context- and issue-specific. 
Active decisions are potentially a procedural innovation to develop the “latent social asset” in 
society. It is, however, important to learn when active decisions are perceived as supportive 
(rather than controlling) and work to build up pro-social preferences. One question might be, 
for example, how often an active decision framework can be applied when its effect varies 
with subject awareness. However, one intervention might be enough to overcome the 
stickiness of a low-contribution status quo for some issues like post-mortem organ donation. 
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TABLE 1 – DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
 
      
 
Percent stating a 
willingness to 
donate blooda 
Percent actually 
donating bloodb 
Percent aware of 
importance of 
donating bloodb 
Number of 
observationsb 
     
     
Medical school (first year) 29.7% 24.0% 72.4% 246 
Medical school (second year) 16.8% 11.0% 88.9% 171 
Biology(first year) 20.2% 8.9% 70.1% 157 
Economics (first year) 8.6% 5.2% 64.4% 399 
Economics (second year) 4.8% 2.0% 74.6% 354 
Journalism (first year) 7.9% 3.9% 57.9% 178 
Law (first year) 8.9% 3.9% 64.3% 333 
      
Total 14.0% 7.6% 69.5% 1,838 
     
     
Notes: a Calculations are based on subjects in the treatment group and control group 1 (N = 1302). 
b Calculations are based on the full sample. 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
 
 
TABLE 2 – THE OUTCOMES OF THE EXPERIMENT 
 
 
 
 
      
 Fraction donating blood, course mean subtracted 
      
      
Importance of 
donating blood 
Treatment 
group 
Control 
group 1 
Control 
group 2  
Difference 
treatment group - 
control group 2 
      
Not aware 0.040 0.010 -0.032  0.072 
N 249 134 177  (0.021) 
      
Aware  -0.015 0.001 0.013  -0.029 
N 654 265 359  (0.015) 
      
      
 Fraction indicating willingness to donate, course mean subtracted 
      
      
Importance of 
donating blood 
Treatment 
group 
Control 
group 1 
Control 
group 2  
Difference 
treatment group - 
control group 1 
      
Not aware 0.055 -0.004 n/a  0.059 
N 249 134   (0.036) 
      
Aware  -0.007 -0.030 n/a  0.023 
N 654 265   (0.024) 
            
      
Notes: Standard error of estimates in parentheses. 
Source: Own calculations. 
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TABLE 3 – THE EFFECT OF ACTIVE DECISIONS ON ACTUAL BLOOD DONATION 
BY AWARENESS OF THE IMPORTANCE OF DONATING BLOOD 
 
Dependent variable: donated blood (=1) 
 
 
 
          
 OLS regressions OLS regressions 
         
     
 Not aware Aware Not aware Aware 
          
     
Treatment group 0.087*** -0.024 0.085*** -0.025 
 
(3.50) 
[2.67] 
(-1.54) 
[1.12] 
(3.38) 
 
(-1.54) 
 
Control group 1 0.045 -0.006 0.035 -0.005 
 
(1.48) 
[1.32] 
 
(-0.26) 
[0.24] 
 
(1.15) 
 
(-0.20) 
 
Control group 2 reference category reference category 
     
Age, sex included. included 
Course included. included 
Pro-social motivationb not included included 
Life goalsc not included included 
Personalityd not included included 
Past Behaviore not included included 
Behavior of relatives and  
 friendsf 
not included 
 
included 
 
     
R2 0.117 0.067 0.184 0.088 
     
N 496 1192 496 1192 
          
    
Notes: Robust z-values are in parentheses. Z-values adjusted for clustering on courses (7) are in 
brackets. The control variables are defined as follows: a six dummy variables for courses; b pro-
social motivations along 4 dimensions reported on 7-point scales; c intrinsic and extrinsic life-
goals along 6 dimensions on 7-point scales; d ten personality characteristics each representing an 
opposite pole of the Big-Five personality dimensions (7-point-scales); e indicates if and when an 
individual made a blood donation in the past; f past blood donation behavior of relatives and 
friends. 
Significance levels: *.05<p<.1, **.01<p<.05, ***p<.01, two-tailed test, z-values in parentheses 
used. 
Source: Own calculations. 
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TABLE 4 – TESTING ALTERNATIVE  EXPLANATIONS OF THE TREATMENT EFFECT 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: DONATED BLOOD (=1) 
 
 
 
 
  
          
 
Interaction of treatments with "no 
previous blood donations"  
Interaction of treatments with 
impatience 
         
     
 Not aware Aware Not aware Aware 
          
     
Treatment group 0.113* -0.019 0.087** -0.03 
 (1.62) (0.55) (2.5) (1.55) 
Control group 1 -0.015 0.059 -0.001 0.097 
 (0.14) (1.03) (0.02) (0.28) 
Treatment group × 
interaction 
-0.034 
(0.46) 
-0.067 
(0.18) 
-0.01 
(0.22) 
0.01 
(0.021) 
Control group 1 × 
interaction 
0.054 
(0.48) 
-0.085 
(1.39) 
0.069 
(1.24) 
-0.027 
(0.64) 
     
Control group 2 reference category reference category 
     
Age, sex included included 
Course included included 
Pro-social motivationb included included 
Life goalsc included included 
Personalityd included included 
Past Behaviore included included 
Behavior of Relatives and 
Friendsf included included 
     
F-test for joint significance  
of interaction effects  
 
p = 0.78  p = 0.79  
F-test for impact on 
behavior of group with 
interaction effect 
 
  p = 0.31  p = 0.55 
     
R2 0.186 0.091 0.184 0.089 
     
N 496 1192 496 1192 
          
    
Notes:  Robust z-values are in parentheses. The control variables are defined as follows: a six 
dummy variables for courses; b pro-social motivations along 4 dimensions reported on 7-point 
scales; c intrinsic and extrinsic life-goals along 6 dimensions on 7-point scales; d ten personality 
characteristics each representing an opposite pole of the Big-Five personality dimensions (7-
point-scales); e indicates whether and when individual made blood donation in the past; f past 
blood-donation behavior of relatives and friends. 
Significance levels: *.05<p<.1, **.01<p<.05, ***p<.01, two-tailed test. 
Source: Own calculations. 
  18 
TABLE 5 – THE EFFECT OF ACTIVE DECISIONS ON THE STATED WILLINGNESS TO DONATE BLOOD 
BY AWARENESS OF THE IMPORTANCE OF DONATING BLOOD 
 
Dependent variable: willingness to donate blood (=1) 
 
 
 
 
          
 OLS regressions OLS regressions 
         
     
 Not aware Aware Not aware Aware 
          
     
Treatment group 0.071* 0.027 0.092** 0.031 
 (1.63) (0.99) (1.99) (1.37) 
Control group 1 reference category reference category 
     
Control group 2 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
     
Age, sex included included 
Course included included 
Pro-social motivationb not included included 
Life goalsc not included included 
Personalityd not included included 
Past behaviore not included included 
Behavior of relatives  
 and friendsf 
not included included 
     
R2 0.084 0.079 0.194 0.133 
     
N 339 855 339 855 
          
    
Notes: Robust z-values are in parentheses. The control variables are defined as follows: a six 
dummy variables for courses; b pro-social motivations along 4 dimensions reported on 7-point 
scales; c intrinsic and extrinsic life-goals along 6 dimensions on 7-point scales; d ten 
personality characteristics each representing an opposite pole of the Big-Five personality 
dimensions (7-point-scales); e indicates if and when an individual made a blood donation in 
the past; f past blood donation behavior of relatives and friends. 
Significance levels: *.05<p<.1, **.01<p<.05, ***p<.01, two-tailed test. 
Source: Own calculations. 
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Appendix 
 
TABLE A.1 – THE EFFECT OF ACTIVE DECISIONS ON ACTUAL BLOOD DONATION, 
BY AWARENESS OF THE IMPORTANCE OF DONATING BLOOD 
 
Dependent variable: donated blood (=1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          
 ML probit ML probit 
         
     
 Not aware  Aware  Not aware  Aware 
          
     
Treatment group 11.56%*** -2.65% 7.72%*** -2.51% 
 (3.01) (-1.33) (2.92) (-1.34) 
Control group 1 11.03%** -1.25% 6.94%** -1.21% 
 (2.14) (-0.56) (1.99) (-0.59) 
Control group 2 reference category reference category 
     
Age, sex included. included 
Course included. included 
Pro-social motivationb not included included 
Life goalsc not included included 
Personalityd not included included 
Past behaviore not included included 
Behavior of relatives and  
 friendsf 
not included 
 
Included 
 
     
Mean predicted frequency 5.01% 5.70% 1.90% 4.98% 
     
N 496 1192 496 1192 
Log Likelihood -118.15 -285.23 -96.35 -273.18 
          
    
Notes: Main table entries are marginal effects for probit regressions, the corresponding z-values 
are in parentheses. The control variables are defined as follows: a six dummy variables for 
courses; b pro-social motivations along 4 dimensions reported on 7-point scales; c intrinsic and 
extrinsic life-goals along 6 dimensions on 7-point scales; d ten personality characteristics each 
representing an opposite pole of the Big-Five personality dimensions (7-point-scales); e indicates 
if and when an individual made a blood donation in the past; f past blood donation behavior of 
relatives and friends. 
Significance levels: *.05<p<.1, **.01<p<.05, ***p<.01 
Source: Own calculations. 
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TABLE A.2 – THE EFFECT OF ACTIVE DECISIONS ON THE STATED WILLINGNESS TO DONATE BLOOD, 
BY AWARENESS OF THE IMPORTANCE OF DONATING BLOOD 
 
Dependent variable: willingness to donate blood (=1) 
 
 
 
 
          
 ML probit ML probit 
         
     
 Not aware Aware Not aware Aware 
          
     
Treatment group 6.88%* 2.86% 8.06%** 3.20% 
 (1.66) (1.16) (2.10) (1.37) 
Control group 1 reference category reference category 
     
Control group 2 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
     
Age, sex included included 
Course included included 
Pro-social motivationb not included included 
Life goalsc not included included 
Personalityd not included included 
Past behaviore not included included 
Behavior of relatives and  
 friendsf 
not included 
 
included 
 
     
Mean predicted frequency 14.70% 11.23% 11.88% 9.22% 
     
N 339 855 339 855 
Log Likelihood -140.07 -304.85 -124.43 -278.70 
          
    
Notes: Main table entries are marginal effects for probit regressions, the corresponding z-
values are in parentheses. The control variables are defined as follows: a six dummy variables 
for courses; b pro-social motivations along 4 dimensions reported on 7-point scales; c intrinsic 
and extrinsic life-goals along 6 dimensions on 7-point scales; d ten personality characteristics 
each representing an opposite pole of the Big-Five personality dimensions (7-point-scales); e 
indicates if and when an individual made a blood donation in the past; f past blood donation 
behavior of relatives and friends. 
Significance levels: *.05<p<.1, **.01<p<.05, ***p<.01 
Source: Own calculations. 
